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Abstract
This study analyzes the information conveyed by the restatements of financial re-
ports. We argue that restatements contain news about the investment projects of the
restating firms’ competitors. This news causes competitors to revise their beliefs about
the projects’ value, and to modify their subsequent investment decisions. Accordingly,
we hypothesize that changes in competitors’ investments after restatement announce-
ments are related to news in the restatements. Consistent with our prediction, we find
that changes in competitors’ investments following restatement announcements are sig-
nificantly related to various proxies for news in the restatements, such as competitors’
and restating firms’ abnormal returns at the restatement announcements. We conclude
that restatements convey information about the investment projects of restating firms’
competitors.
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1 Introduction
This paper examines whether restatements of financial reports convey information about
corporate investments. Restatements occur when financial reports are discovered not to
be consistent with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).1 Announcements of
restatements convey new information, since restating firms experience a significant decline in
their market value (e.g., Palmrose et al. [2004]). Furthermore, information is transferred from
restating firms to competitors in their industry, because competitors also sustain significantly
negative abnormal returns when restating firms announce a restatement (Xu et al. [2006],
Kravet and Shevlin [2007], Gleason et al. [2008]). The nature of the information being
transferred from restating firms to their competitors at the restatement announcement is
currently not well understood. Existing studies link this information transfer to contagion,
whereby restatements signal that accounting information in the restating firms’ industry is of
lower quality than previously thought (Xu et al. [2006], Kravet and Shevlin [2007], Gleason
et al. [2008]). We extend our understanding of the information transfer between restating
firms and their competitors by proposing a novel explanation for this information transfer.
Specifically, we posit that restatements of financial reports provide new information to
competitors about the payoffs of their investment projects. We consider a model where the
payoff of a competitor’s investment project is unknown. This lack of knowledge can be due
to uncertainties about strategic choices of other firms in the competitor’s industry and about
industry-level demand and cost conditions. A restatement is assumed to be an exogenous
signal that conveys information to the competitor about its project’s unknown payoff. Re-
statements of other firms’ financial reports are informative for the competitor’s investment
decision, because financial reports themselves are inputs into this investment decision. Other
firms’ financial reports can help competitors mitigate uncertainty about demand and cost
1Once a firm detects a prior accounting error, it has to disclose (in the period when the error is identified
and corrected) both the nature of the error and the effect of its correction (if material) on each financial
statement line item and any per share amounts affected. The correction of the prior error implies a “prior-
period adjustment” to the beginning balance in retained earnings, as well as a restatement of previously
issued financial statements (see APB Opinion No. 20 (APB [1971]), replaced by SFAS No. 154 in 2005
(FASB [2005])).
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conditions, since these conditions are interrelated within industries (Mitchell and Mulherin
[1996]). Moreover, financial reports can help competitors mitigate uncertainty about other
firms’ strategic choices, by providing external information about these other firms. Com-
petitors rely on such external information for their strategic decisions, such as pricing and
benchmarking (Simmonds [1982], Cardinaels et al. [2004], Maiga and Jacobs [2006]). Finan-
cial reports are considered a cost-effective source of other firms’ external information (Lord
[1996], Palepu et al. [2000]), and are used as such (Simons [1990], Guilding [1999], Guilding
et al. [2000]). Accordingly, Moon and Bates [1993] argue that “the published annual report
[of another firm] is an excellent source document from which to estimate and extrapolate
such data [for strategic decisions] whilst avoiding prohibitive collection costs”.
We contend that competitors’ investment decisions are affected not only by a firm’s finan-
cial reports in general, but by the restatement of these financial reports in particular. Extant
evidence suggests that restatements release considerable information about restating firms.
For instance, Palmrose et al. [2004] document that restating firms sustain mean abnormal
returns of about −9% during the two days surrounding the restatement announcement. The
majority of restatements involve sales and operating expenses, with sales generally being
the most frequently restated account Palmrose and Scholz [2004]. These are core accounts
that reflect continuing business activities and are considered particularly salient by financial
statement users such as investors, boards of directors and financial analysts (Abarbanell and
Lehavy [2002], Lougee and Marquardt [2004], Bushman et al. [2006]). More importantly
in our context, information involving core accounts, such sales, market share and costs, is
useful to competitors for their strategic decisions (Simmonds [1982], Simons [1990], Guilding
[1999], Guilding et al. [2000]). Since the majority of restatements involve core accounts, they
likely are informative for competitors’ investments.
The preceding discussion suggests that financial reports in general, and restatements of
financial reports in particular, provide useful information for a competitor’s investment de-
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cisions.2 Accordingly, in our model, a restatement announcement causes the restating firm’s
competitor to revise its prior beliefs about the unknown payoffs of its investment project,
using Bayesian updating. This revision of the competitor’s beliefs leads to a subsequent
change in its investments. Thus our main hypothesis is that changes in competitors’ invest-
ments after a restatement announcement are related to the news in the restatement. To
test this hypothesis, we consider the competitors of 713 firms that announce restatements
between 1997 and 2002, using data from the General Accounting Office (GAO) [2003]. This
period is particularly interesting in our setting, because financial reports appear to contain
more proprietary information since 1997 when the implementation of SFAS No. 131 led to
increasingly detailed segment reporting (FASB [1997], Botosan and Stanford [2005], Berger
and Hann [2007]). Many firms worried that the more detailed reporting required by SFAS
No. 131 would put them at a competitive disadvantage (Ettredge et al. [2002]). Compared
to selected benchmark companies, competitors invest significantly less after restatement an-
nouncements. Their average benchmark-adjusted investment decreases by between 3% and
16% in each one of three years after a restatement announcement. To examine whether
these changes in competitors’ investments are related to news in the restatement, we use
three news proxies.
The first news proxy is competitors’ abnormal returns at the restatement announcement.
If a restatement conveys news about competitors’ projects, its announcement leads investors
to revise their beliefs about the value of these projects. Consequently, competitors’ stock
prices at the restatement announcement impound this news. As hypothesized, we find that
changes in competitors’ investments during the three years after a restatement announce-
2Consider WorldCom, which revealed in June 2002 that it overstated net income by $3.8 billion in 2001
and the first quarter of 2002 (Sandberg et al. [2002]). This inflated net income was mostly due to line costs
that were erroneously capitalized for $3.055 billion in 2001 and for $797 million in the first quarter of 2002
(WorldCom [2002]). Using the reported WorldCom financial data, other telecommunication companies likely
overestimated the value of acquiring additional customers, and overpaid for new customers (Sidak [2003]).
WorldCom’s restatement announcement in June 2002 revealed that line costs were higher than expected, and
thus likely affected the value of its competitors’ investments (see also Sadka [2006]). According to William
Esrey, Sprint’s former chairman and CEO, WorldCom’s overstated net income had a substantial impact on
industry investment (Cowley [2002]). Similarly, C. Michael Armstrong, the former CEO of ATT, attributed
his decision to sell off ATT’s cable unit to WorldCom’s accounting fraud (Blumenstein and Grant [2004]).
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ment are significantly related to their abnormal returns at the restatement announcement.
Specifically, when their abnormal returns at the restatement announcement decrease by one
standard deviation (2.5%), competitors subsequently lower their investment by 0.85%, which
is 5.9% of their mean investment. Our results hold after controlling for other factors that
affect competitors’ investments, such as external financing, cash, growth options, market
share, size, and prior-year performance.
Our next two news proxies are restating firms’ abnormal returns at the restatement
announcement and the restatement amounts. Consistent with our prediction, changes in
competitors’ investments during the three years after a restatement announcement are sig-
nificantly related to restating firms’ abnormal returns at the restatement announcement and
to the restatement amounts. Moreover, we find that these two measures are better proxies
for the news in the restatement about competitors’ projects when the economic interdepen-
dencies between competitors and restating firms are larger, consistent with the information
transfer literature (Pyo and Lustgarten [1990], Frost [1995]). Specifically, subsequent changes
in competitors’ investments are more strongly related to restating firms’ abnormal returns
and to the restatement amounts when the correlations between restating firms’ and com-
petitors’ returns are bigger, and when the restating firms’ market shares are higher.
Finally, we analyze which one of our three news proxies is more strongly related to sub-
sequent changes in competitors’ investments, and thus constitutes a more powerful proxy
for news in restatements about competitors’ projects. In a regression of subsequent changes
in competitors’ investments on the three news proxies, we find that all three news prox-
ies yield significantly positive coefficients, with competitors’ abnormal returns having the
highest economic and statistical significance. This evidence offers two insights. First, com-
petitors’ abnormal returns constitute the most powerful of our three news proxies. Second,
competitors’ and restating firms’ abnormal returns as well as restatement amounts are not
equivalent as proxies for the news in the restatement about competitors’ projects. Rather,
they appear to capture different aspects of this news. Moreover, it is possible that competi-
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tors’ and restating firms’ abnormal returns do not just proxy for the news in the restatement,
but provide additional information to competitors beyond the news in the restatement. This
conjecture is consistent with the finance literature, which shows that stock markets can
provide new information that affects investments (Morck et al. [1990], Chen et al. [2007]).
Overall, our evidence shows that changes in competitors’ investments after restatement
announcements are significantly related to information released at restatement announce-
ments, consistent with the hypothesis that restatements convey news about competitors’
projects. This study is the first to document such a relation, thus adding to a vast informa-
tion transfer literature in accounting starting with Foster [1981]. Closest to our work are the
studies arguing that the information transfer between restating firms and their competitors
reflects contagion (Xu et al. [2006], Kravet and Shevlin [2007], Gleason et al. [2008]). Our
study offers a novel explanation, and suggests that the information transfer at least partly
occurs because restatements have implications for competitors’ investments. While this ex-
planation does not preclude restatements from also carrying other information and reflecting
contagion, we are careful to control for any contagion effects in our empirical analysis.
The present study also extends an increasing literature showing that financial reports
provide incremental information for investments, and affect the allocation of resources in the
economy (e.g., Ball and Shivakumar [2005]). The relation between errors in financial reports
and investments is not well understood at this point (Healy and Wahlen [1999]), because few
papers to date have analyzed it. The first such study uses a theoretical model to link errors
in financial reports to competitors’ investments via competitors’ external financing (Bar-Gill
and Bebchuk [2003]). Specifically, errors in financial reports allow low quality firms that end
up restating to pool with their high quality competitors that do not restate, so that the cost
of external financing falls for restating firms and rises for their competitors. Restating firms
then overinvest whereas their competitors underinvest. We extend the work of Bar-Gill and
Bebchuk [2003] by abstracting away from external financing. Instead, we contend that errors
in financial reports affect competitors’ investments directly, since financial reports are one of
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competitors’ information sources for their investment decisions. We nevertheless recognize
that our empirical results could be driven by external financing and therefore use various
empirical controls for the impact of external financing on competitors’ investments.
The second set of studies links errors in financial reports to competitors’ investments
via restating firms’ real decisions (Sadka [2006], Kedia and Philippon [2007]).3 Specifically,
restating firms make real decisions to hide their intentional fraudulent accounting. Com-
petitors in turn adjust their investments in response to restating firms’ real decisions (Sadka
[2006]). We add to these papers by considering a different and more immediate link between
restating firms’ financial reports and their competitors’ investments, according to which re-
stating firms’ financial reports are a direct input to competitors’ investment decisions. We
use various measures to empirically control for the strategic relations between competitors
and restating firms. Finally, Chen and Lai [2007] analyze vertical information transfers
along the supply chain and suggest that customers as well as suppliers in upstream and
downstream industries change their investments following a restatement. We extend their
work by focussing on competitors in the same industry as restating firms, and not on the
customers and suppliers of restating firms.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the hypotheses, Section
3 presents the data, Section 4 discusses the main findings, Section 5 considers sensitivity
tests, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Hypotheses development
This section develops our testable hypotheses regarding the link between news in restate-
ments and competitors’ investments. These hypotheses are derived from a model that il-
lustrates how restatements influence competitors’ investments by providing a signal about
3Sadka [2006] develops a theoretical model, using WorldCom to illustrate the model’s implications. Kedia
and Philippon [2007] also build a model. Furthermore, they empirically analyze the investment and hiring
decisions of restating firms and their competitors. They do not link these decisions to news in restatements.
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their investments’ unknown payoffs, as further described below.
2.1 Model setup
We use a two-period setup to show how restatements affect changes over time in a competi-
tor’s optimal investments. A risk-neutral competitor considers investing It at the start of
both t = 1 and t = 2. Each investment It yields a payoff P˜t = p˜tf(It) at end of period t,
where f(·) is a known and concave function. The random variable p˜t captures the uncer-
tainty about the payoff of the investment, reflecting the competitor’s lack of knowledge about
factors such industry-level demand and cost conditions, or strategic choices of other firms in
its industry. We assume that p˜t is normally distributed as N(θ, σ
2
ǫ ), and can be written as
p˜t = θ + ǫ˜t, where ǫ˜t ∼ N(0, σ2ǫ ), and ǫ˜1 and ǫ˜2 are independent. The distinguishing feature
of our setup is that the payoff parameter θ is not known. Rather, the competitor has a prior
about θ that is normally distributed as N(θ1, σ
2
1) and reflects its information set Ω1 at t = 1.
The timeline is as follows. The competitor optimally invests I∗1 at the start of t = 1,
using its prior information Ω1. At the end of t = 1, the project’s payoff P˜1 is realized, and
the competitor updates its prior about the unknown payoff parameter θ based on this payoff.
Right at the start of t = 2, an exogenous restatement r˜ occurs that is informative about
θ. The competitor updates its beliefs about θ based on the restatement. The competitor
then optimally invests I∗2 at the start of t = 2. We analyze how the news about θ in the
restatement r˜ affects the change in the optimal investments between t = 1 and t = 2, I∗2−I∗1 .
The competitor’s information set Ω1 can include information from other firms’ finan-
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cial reports for two reasons.4 First, competitors can use other firms’ financial reports to
mitigate their uncertainty about demand and cost conditions, because these conditions are
interrelated to various degrees within industries (Mitchell and Mulherin [1996]). Second,
competitors can use other firms’ financial reports to mitigate their uncertainty about other
firms’ strategic choices which in turn affect their own strategic decision-making and control
activities.5 For instance, competitors rely on other firms’ financial reports for strategic activ-
ities such as pricing (Simmonds [1982]), monitoring other firms’ strategic positions via their
costs or market shares (Simmonds [1986], Shank and Govindarajan [1988], Bromwich [1990],
Ittner and Larcker [1997]), and benchmarking against other firms (Elnathan and Kim [1995],
Elnathan et al. [1996], Biers et al. [1999], Cardinaels et al. [2004], Maiga and Jacobs [2006]).
Evidence shows that in practice competitors use other firms’ published financial reports for
strategic decisions (Simons [1990], Guilding [1999], Guilding et al. [2000]).6
Competitors’ use of other firms’ financial reports as an information source for their invest-
ment decisions is subject to two qualifications. First, other firms anticipate that competitors
rely on their financial reports, and thus consider proprietary concerns in their accounting
choices (Choi and Levich [1990], Harris [1998], Berger and Hann [2003], Graham et al. [2005],
Botosan and Stanford [2005], Berger and Hann [2007]). Second, financial reports involve
4An large theoretical literature argues that financial reports contain proprietary information, or non-
proprietary information correlated with the former. References include studies on disclosure starting with
Verrecchia [1983], where financial reports provide proprietary information (Dye [1985, 1990]) depending on:
the costs of entering the rival’s market and prior information (Darrough and Stoughton [1990]), the correlation
between non-proprietary and proprietary information (Dye [1986]), the type of information (Gal-Or [1985,
1986], Feltham and Xie [1992], Clinch and Verrecchia [1997], Darrough [1993], Hayes and Lundholm [1996],
Richardson [2001]), the type of the competition (Clarke [1983], Gal-Or [1986], Darrough [1993]), financial data
aggregation (Feltham et al. [1992], Hayes and Lundholm [1996]), the type of agents interested in disclosure
(Wagenhofer [1990], Feltham and Xie [1992], Newman and Sansing [1993], Gigler [1994]), external financing
needs (Bhattacharya and Ritter [1983]) and product differentiation (Vives [1984]).
5Strategic decision-making and control involves setting strategic objectives, implementing these objec-
tives, monitoring the realized performance against the objectives, and providing feedback on the realized
performance (Goold and Quinn [1990], Ittner and Larcker [1997], Guilding et al. [2000]). The role of knowl-
edge about other firms’ strategic choices is complicated in more oligopolistic markets where competitors
anticipate other firms’ strategies. Companies may then have incentives to share information voluntarily in
order to collude, or to conceal it. References regarding the role of information in oligopolistic industries
include Milgrom and Roberts [1982] and Gal-Or [1986] for cost uncertainty, Vives [1984] and Gal-Or [1985]
for demand uncertainty, and Clarke [1983] for both cost and demand uncertainty.
6We do not take into account information acquisition costs. Papers considering costly information acqui-
sition for capital budgeting include Harris and Raviv [1996] and Kim [2006].
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historical costs and are thus to a large extent backward-looking. In our context, backward-
looking information can still be informative for investment decisions if it correlates with
post-investment demand and cost conditions, or if it provides strategic information.
Given Ω1, the value V1 of the competitor’s project at the beginning of t = 1 is V1 =














, where I∗t denotes the
optimal investment in t, θ1 is the mean of the prior distribution at t = 1 for the unknown
θ (that is, E1[p˜t|Ω1] = E1[θ|Ω1] = θ1), and k is the constant risk-adjusted discount rate.
We now derive the optimal investment in t = 1 in order to show (in the next section) how
the change in optimal investments between t = 1 and t = 2 is affected by the news in the
restatement. The optimal investment decision in t = 1 is given by ∂V1
∂I∗
1
= 0, which yields
f ′(I∗1 ) =
1
θ1
, or I∗1 = F (
1
θ1






and F (·) is the inverse function of f ′(·).
Thus, the optimal investment I∗1 in t = 1 depends on the competitor’s prior θ1 about θ.
We next derive the competitor’s beliefs about the unknown θ at the start of t = 2, which
reflect its information set Ω2 before the restatement occurs. After the realization of the
investment’s payoff P˜1 at the end of t = 1, the competitor updates its prior about θ based
on this payoff. The resulting posterior at the beginning of t = 2 is normally distributed as
N(θ2, σ
2













(Lee [1989]). The value
of the projet at the start of t = 2 is then V2 = −I∗2 + θ2f(I∗2 ).
2.2 Learning from restatements
At time t = τ shortly after the start of t = 2 and before the investment I∗2 is made, an
exogenous restatement is announced that carries information about the unknown parame-
ter θ.7 Restatements contain such information on two conditions. First, restatement have
7We assume that the restatement announcement is an exogenous signal that does not result from the
restating firm’s optimal disclosure strategies, since restatements are oftentimes not initiated by the restating
firm itself, but by the SEC or the restating firm’s external auditor. Existing studies as well as the evidence
in Table 3 suggest that between 14% and 25% of the restatements are initiated by the SEC or the FASB,
between 5% and 18% by the external auditor, with the remainder being initiated by the restating firm or
unattributed (Palmrose et al. [2004], Kravet and Shevlin [2007], Chen and Lai [2007], Gleason et al. [2008]).
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implications for the competitors’ projects. Existing evidence indicates that restatements
provide significant information about restating firms. On average, restating firms in our
sample experience abnormal returns of −8.2% during the two days surrounding the restate-
ment announcement, consistent with the literature (Kinney and McDaniel [1989], Dechow
et al. [1996], GAO [2002], Palmrose et al. [2004], Xu et al. [2006], Gleason et al. [2008]).
The amounts restated are quite large; in our sample they represent on average about 9% of
the restating firms’ total assets (see also Palmrose and Scholz [2004]). The most commonly
restated items are sales and operating expenses, with sales representing about 40% of all re-
stated accounts (Palmrose and Scholz [2004], Kravet and Shevlin [2007], Gleason et al. [2008],
Wilson [2008]). Sales and operating expenses are core accounts that embody continuing and
repetitive business activities and likely persist into the future (Lev [1983], Penman [2004]).
Core accounts yield stronger investor reactions than non-core accounts (Kormendi and Lipe
[1987], Easton and Zmijewski [1989], Elliott and Hanna [1996]), are more intensively used
in executive pay contracts (Natarajan [1996], Baber et al. [1998], Bushman et al. [2006]),
are the central focus of financial analysts’ activity (Abarbanell and Lehavy [2002]), and may
explain companies’ pro forma earnings releases (Bradshaw and Sloan [2002], Bhattacharya
et al. [2003], Lougee and Marquardt [2004]). Furthermore, within core accounts, sales yield
a stronger investor reaction than expenses (Ertimur et al. [2003]). Users of financial reports
thus appear to attach particular attention to core items, especially to revenues. More im-
portantly in our context, information involving other firms’ core accounts, such as sales,
return on sales, costs and market shares, is used by competitors for their strategic decision-
making and control activities (Simmonds [1982], Simons [1990], Guilding [1999], Guilding
et al. [2000]). Since restatements for the most part involve core accounts, they likely matter
for the investment decisions of restating firms’ competitors.
Second, the restatement is not perfectly expected and entirely captured by the prior
information set Ω2 at the beginning of t = 2. The literature suggests that this condition
holds. Restating firms and their competitors generally experience negative abnormal returns
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at the restatement announcement (Palmrose et al. [2004], Xu et al. [2006], Kravet and Shevlin
[2007], Gleason et al. [2008]). Moreover, financial analysts and institutional investors do not
appear to fully anticipate restatements (Griffin [2003], Hribar et al. [2005]). The only group
of investors able to predict restatements are insiders and short-sellers (Dechow et al. [1996],
Desai et al. [2002], Griffin [2003], Efendi et al. [2005]).
Let the public restatement r˜ thus constitute a noisy signal about the unknown payoff
parameter θ, r˜ = γθ+e˜. The known parameter γ captures the impact of θ on the restatement,
which depends on economic factors such as the interdependencies between restating firms
and their competitors, as well as on accounting factors, such as conservatism and the restated
accounts (Dye and Sridhar [2004]). The random variable e˜ is noise that is unrelated to θ,
not separably observable from θ, independent from ǫ˜t, and normally distributed as N(0, σ
2
e).
The competitor uses the observed restatement to update its beliefs about the unknown
payoff parameter θ, leading to a posterior that is normally distributed as N(θτ , σ
2
τ ), where















(see Appendix A for the derivation). The
value of the project at the start of t = 2, after the restatement, is Vτ = −I∗2 + θτf(I∗2 ).
The optimal investment in t = 2 is I∗2 = F (
1
θτ
) and depends on the competitor’s posterior
mean θτ about the unknown payoff parameter θ. The change in optimal investments between
t = 2 and t = 1 is then:
∆I∗ = I∗2 − I∗1 = F (
1
(1− zτ )θ2 + zτ rγ
)− F ( 1
θ1
). (1)
Equation (1) shows that the change over time in optimal investments ∆I∗ is affected by two
pieces of news. The first piece is the news about the unknown payoff parameter θ in the
realized payoff at the end of t = 1, which leads the competitor to update its beliefs about
θ from θ1 in t = 1 to θ2 at the start of t = 2. The second piece is the news about θ in
the restatement at the beginning of t = 2, which causes the competitor to update its beliefs
about θ from θ2 at the start of t = 2 to θτ shortly thereafter. Equation (1) shows that if the
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restatement conveys news that leads the competitor to update its beliefs about the payoff of
its investment project, then the change in optimal investments ∆I∗ is affected by this news
in the restatement. Our main testable implication is therefore that changes in competitors’
investments after the restatement announcement are related to news in the restatement. The
next section discusses our three empirical news proxies and develops testable predictions.
2.3 News proxies
Our three news proxies are: competitors’ abnormal returns at the restatement announce-
ment, restating firms’ abnormal returns at the restatement announcement, and the restate-
ment amounts, as explained further below.
2.3.1 Competitors’ abnormal returns
We rely on five assumptions to discuss our first news proxy: (1) the competitor and investors
have the same information set Ω2 before the restatement announcement, (2) the competi-
tor and investors have the same learning process about the unknown payoff parameter θ,
(3) the competitor and investors have the same information set Ωτ after the restatement
announcement, (4) the competitor has no projects other than the investments It in t = 1
and t = 2, and (5) there are no other news before the competitor invests I∗2 in t = 2 after
the restatement announcement. When the restatement conveys news about the competitor’s
project, investors revise their beliefs about the value of this project, based on their updated
posterior N [θτ , σ
2
τ ]. Given our five assumptions above, the change in the competitor’s value
at the restatement announcement then reflects this revision in investors’ belief, if markets
are efficient. We thus use competitors’ abnormal returns at the restatement announcement
as our first news proxy.
We make no prediction for the sign of the relation between the change in the competitor’s
investments ∆I∗ as given by equation (1) and our first news proxy. This relation depends
on various factors, such as nature of the information conveyed by the restatement and the
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investment function f(·), and can be positive or negative.8 As an example, consider a
restatement signaling to the competitor that raising the investment in t = 2, compared to
the investment in t = 1, is optimal and enhances firm value. The increase in investments
between t = 2 and t = 1 is then accompanied by positive abnormal returns. However, it
is possible that the news is such that reducing the investment in t = 2, compared to the
investment in t = 1, is optimal and enhances firm value. The competitor’s positive abnormal
returns are then accompanied by a decrease in investments between t = 2 and t = 1.
The assumptions made at the start of this section may not hold, for four reasons. First,
we ignore the market structure, which may impact the competitor’s abnormal returns at the
restatement announcement (Chamley [2004]). Second, competitors and investors may not
have the same information set before and after the restatement announcement, nor learn
from this announcement in a similar fashion. Third, the competitor’s returns may reflect
news not only about its investment projects, but also about other factors, such as the quality
of its financial reports (Xu et al. [2006], Kravet and Shevlin [2007], Gleason et al. [2008]).
Fourth, the competitor may have projects other than the two investments in t = 1 and t = 2.
If the assumptions do not hold, then the competitor’s abnormal returns measure the news
in the restatement about its projects with error. This implies that the slope coefficient in a
regression of scaled changes in competitors’ investments on competitors’ abnormal returns
is biased away from its true value.9 Our first testable hypothesis is as follows.
Hypothesis 1. Ceteris paribus, the scaled changes in competitors’ investments following
restatement announcements are related to competitors’ abnormal returns at the restatement
8The change in the competitor’s value ∆V Cτ at the restatement announcement is ∆V
C
τ = (−I∗2 + I∗1 ) +
(−I∗1 + E2[I∗2 ]) + θτf(I∗2 ) − θ2f(E2[I∗2 ]). The first two terms in this expression, −I∗2 + I∗1 , are the change
the actual investments between t = 2 and t = 1, and correspond to the (negative of the) change in the
competitor’s optimal investments in equation (1). The second two terms, −I∗1 + E2[I∗2 ], are the change
between the actual investment in t = 1 and the investment in t = 2 before the restatement announcement,
as expected by investors. The last two terms, θτf(I
∗
2 )− θ2f(E2[I∗2 ]), reflect the change in the investment’s
expected payoff between t = τ and t = 2 before the restatement announcement. The sign of the relation
between the change in the competitor’s investments ∆I∗ and the change in its value ∆V Cτ thus depends on
the covariance between ∆I∗ and the various terms in ∆V Cτ , which can be positive or negative.
9If the error in our news proxy is independent from the news in the restatement about competitors’
investments, then the slope coefficient is biased towards zero.
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announcements.
2.3.2 Restating firms’ abnormal returns
The change in the restating firm’s value at the restatement announcement can be related to
the change in the competitor’s value via the covariance between the competitor’s cash flows




∆V Rτ , where σRC is the covariance
between the restating firm’s earnings and the competitor’s cash flows, and σ2R is the variance
of the restating firm’s earnings (see also Pyo and Lustgarten [1990]).
We argue in the previous section that the change in the competitor’s value ∆V Cτ reflects
news in the restatement about its projects. The extent to which the change in the restating
firm’s value ∆V Rτ proxies for the news in the restatement about the competitor’s projects
then depends on the covariance σRC between the restating firm and the competitor. All
else being equal, when this covariance is higher, the relation between the competitor’s and
the restating firm’s change in value at the restatement announcement is stronger. Restating
firm’s abnormal returns then are a better proxy for the news in the restatement about the
competitor’s projects.
Restating firms’ abnormal returns thus measure news in the restatement about competi-
tors’ investments with error, since they do not consider the covariance between the competi-
tor and the restating firm. We discuss the effect of the covariance below, in Section 2.3.4.
An error in the news proxy affects the estimated slope coefficient in a regression of scaled
changes in competitors’ investments on restating firms’ abnormal returns, and biases it away
from its true value. In the absence of errors, we do not make a prediction for the sign of
this slope coefficient, because this sign depends on the covariance between the change in the
competitor’s investments ∆I∗ and σRC
σ2
R
∆V Rτ , which can be positive or negative, as discussed
in Section 2.3.1. We thus obtain our second testable hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. Ceteris paribus, the scaled changes in competitors’ investments following
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restatement announcements are related to restating firms’ abnormal returns at the restate-
ment announcements.
2.3.3 Restatement amounts
Equation (1) shows that the change in the competitor’s investments is related to the restate-
ment amount r. The form of this relation depends on four other factors: (1) the marginal
effect γ of the unknown payoff parameter θ on the restatement amount, (2) the weight zτ
assigned to the restatement amount in the learning process, (3) the form of the investment
function f(·), and (4) the priors θ1 and θ2 for the unknown payoff parameter θ. Depending
on the values of these four factors, the relation between the change in the competitor’s in-
vestments and the restatement amount can be positive or negative. We thus do not make a
prediction about the sign of this relation, so that our third hypothesis obtains.
Hypothesis 3. Ceteris paribus, the scaled changes in competitors’ investments following
restatement announcements are related to restatement amounts.
2.3.4 Cross-sectional predictions
Our discussion above suggests that changes in the competitor’s investments are more strongly
related our two news proxies based on restating firms (i.e. the restating firms’ abnormal
returns and the restatement amounts) when there are more interdependencies between re-
stating firms and their competitors. Regarding the restating firm’s abnormal returns, more
interdependencies imply a larger covariance between the restating firm and its competitor.
Our discussion in Section 2.3.2 suggests that a restating firm’s abnormal returns are then
more likely to capture news in the restatement about the competitor’s projects. Regarding
the restatement amount, recall that its link to the changes in the competitor’s investments
depends on four factors, including the marginal effect γ of the unknown θ on the restatement
amount. All else being equal, when the interdependencies between the restating firm and its
competitor are larger, this marginal effect γ likely is higher too. As a result, the restatement
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amount reflects more information about the competitor’s projects.
Empirically, we use two measures for the interdependencies between the restating firm
and its competitor. The first one is the correlation between the restating firm and its com-
petitor. The interdependencies between the restating firm and its competitor are larger when
competitors and restating firms are more correlated. The evidence in Pyo and Lustgarten
[1990] and Bannister [1994] suggests that this correlation is generally positive. We use com-
petitors’ and restating firms’ raw returns in the fiscal year before the year of the restatement
announcement to measure their correlation. Our fourth testable hypothesis follows.
Hypothesis 4. Ceteris paribus, the relation between the scaled changes in competitors’
investments following restatement announcements and restating firms’ abnormal returns as
well as restatement amounts is stronger when competitors’ and restating firms’ returns are
more correlated.
Next, we consider the restating firm’s market share as a measure of the interdependencies
between the restating firm and its competitor. Industries where restating firms have a
higher market share may be more concentrated, so that companies in these industries are
more homogenous, and interdependencies between the restating firm and its competitors are
higher (Foster [1981], Frost [1995]). This effect is however offset by the fact that the restating
firm’s market share influences its disclosure incentives through proprietary costs, although
in a theoretically ambiguous manner.10 Empirically, extant studies suggest that restating
firms with a higher market share disclose less proprietary information (Harris [1998], Botosan
and Stanford [2005]), thus making is less likely that their restatements contain news about
competitors’ projects. Given these two offsetting effects, we do not predict a sign for the
impact of restating firms’ market shares on the link between the change in competitors’
10Proprietary costs may be higher when the restating firm’s market share is lower and the number of
competitors is higher. Alternatively, proprietary costs may be higher when the restating firm’s market
share is higher and rents are larger. Models predicting less disclosure when proprietary costs are higher
include Verrecchia [1983], Dye [1985], Darrough and Stoughton [1990], Darrough [1993], Wagenhofer [1990],
Feltham and Xie [1992], Newman and Sansing [1993], Hayes and Lundholm [1996], and Richardson [2001].
Models predicting more disclosure when proprietary costs are higher include Darrough and Stoughton [1990],
Newman and Sansing [1993], and Gigler [1994].
16
investments and our two news proxies based on restating firms. Our fifth testable hypothesis
obtains.
Hypothesis 5. Ceteris paribus, the relation between the scaled changes in competitors’
investments following restatement announcements and restating firms’ abnormal returns as
well as restatement amounts depends on restating firms’ market shares.
3 Sample
Table 1 details the sample selection. Data on restatements are obtained from the General
Accounting Office from January 1, 1997 through June 30, 2002 (GAO [2003]). The GAO
focusses on restatements due to accounting irregularities, such as “aggressive” accounting
practices, intentional and unintentional misuse of facts applied to financial statements, over-
sight or misinterpretation of accounting rules, and fraud. The GAO database contains 916
restatement announcements by 839 firms. We do not consider restatements beyond 2002
since we measure competitors’ investments over various intervals, such as three years, after a
restatement announcement. Accounting data are from COMPUSTAT, and stock price data
from CRSP. Eliminating observations without information on COMPUSTAT or CRSP leaves
836 restatements by 758 firms. Instances where firms modify their fiscal year end during the
restatement year are also excluded, which results in a final sample of 785 restatements by
713 firms.
Table 2 presents the number and percentage of the 785 restatements by 2-digit SIC
industry. The highest percentage of restatements occurs in the following industries: Busi-
ness Services (17.58%); Industrial And Commercial Machinery And Computer Equipment
(7.64%); Electronic And Other Electrical Equipment And Components, Except Computer
Equipment (7.01%). Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for the restatements. Our findings
are consistent with the evidence in the literature (Palmrose et al. [2004], Kravet and Shevlin
[2007], Gleason et al. [2008]). Panel A indicates that the number of restatements has steadily
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increased between 1997 and 2002. Panel B shows that about 14% of the sample restatements
are initiated by the SEC or some other agency, 7% by the auditor, and 42% by the restating
firm, with the remaining being largely unattributed. The accounts most frequently restated
involve revenues (38.85%), followed by restructuring, assets and inventory (13.63%), as well
as expenses (12.48%). Restatements thus frequently implicate core accounts. Furthermore,
the data suggest that SAB 101 “Revenue Recognition in Financial Statements”, issued in
December 1999, plays a role in our sample restatements, since restatements become more
numerous after 1999, and involve many firms in the Business Services’ industry. We control
for any time effects due to regulations such as SAB 101 in our empirical analysis.
All companies in the same fiscal year and 4-digit industry as a restating firm are retained
as competitors for that particular restating firm and restatement announcement date. The
restating firms themselves are excluded, so that there are no restating firms amongst the
competitors. This procedure results in a final competitor sample of 73,667 firm-years (8,500
firms) on the 4-digit SIC level.
4 Results
We start by providing descriptive statistics on changes in competitors’ investments around
the restatement announcement, and on our three proxies for the news in the restatement.
Then we examine whether the changes in competitors’ investments following restatement
announcements are related to the news proxies. Moreover, we analyze cross-sectional vari-
ation in the extent to which our two proxies based on restating firms capture news in the
restatement about competitors’ projects. Finally, we investigate which one of the three news
proxies is most strongly related to changes in competitors’ investments.
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4.1 Descriptive statistics
4.1.1 Changes in competitors’ investments
We examine whether competitors show systematic changes in their investments for the five
years before the restatement announcement (year -5 to year -1), the year of the restatement
announcement (year 0), and the five years after the restatement announcement (year 1 to
year 5) in Table 4. In our discussion, we focus on the years after the restatement announce-
ment; the preceding years are included for comparison in Table 4. We use two measures for
competitors’ investments. The first one is the raw scaled annual change in a competitor’s
investment I between fiscal years t − 1 and t, It−It−1
It−1
. Investment I is capital expenditure
(COMPUSTAT #128) plus R&D expense (COMPUSTAT #46), scaled by prior-year total
assets (COMPUSTAT #6), following Baker et al. [2003] and Chen et al. [2007]. Our sec-
ond measure is the benchmark-adjusted scaled annual change in a competitor’s investment,
defined as the difference between raw scaled annual change in investment for a competitor
and its benchmark firm. The benchmark-adjusted change controls for the normal change in
a competitor’s investment, absent any news in restatements about its projects. Our choice
of benchmark firms is complicated by the fact that competitors are in the same 4-digit in-
dustry as restating firms. We thus are not able to rely on the traditional approach of using
benchmark firms in the same industry as restating firms, since, by definition, these bench-
mark firms would be competitors. Benchmark firms are therefore those firms that belong to
4-digit industries without a restatement in our sample period of 1997 to 2002. This choice of
benchmark firms is problematic, because benchmark firms operating in different industries
are inherently distinct from competitors. Industries without restatements may attract more
capital if investors shift their funds away from industries with restatements. The multivari-
ate analysis in Section 4.2 addresses this concern by controlling for the competitors’ ability
to raise external financing.
Panel A (Panel B) of Table 4 shows the raw (benchmark-adjusted) changes in competitors’
investments. Column (3) of Panel A indicates that mean competitor investment increases
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by 12.7% in year 0, decreases by 4.3% in year 1, and rises again by 2.5% in year 2, and
declines by 15.0% in year 3. As Panel B shows, benchmark firms increase their investments
during those years, and do so to a larger extent than competitors. Accordingly, the mean
benchmark-adjusted change in competitors’ investments is significantly negative at −5.6% in
year 0, −5.2% in year 1, −2.6% in year 2 and −16.2% in year 3. The findings for the medians
confirm that competitors experience declining investments starting in year 0 compared to
benchmark firms. Hence, relative to benchmark firms, competitors of restating firms appear
to significantly lower their investments after restatement announcements. This result is
consistent with our argument that competitors modify their investments as a result of news
in restatements. We provide a formal test of our argument in Section 4.2.
4.1.2 News in the restatement
Table 5 provides descriptive statistics for the three news proxies: (1) competitors’ abnormal
returns at the restatement announcement CARi,−τ ,+τ , (2) restating firms’ abnormal returns
at the restatement announcement CARj,−τ ,+τ , and (3) the restatement amount Restatj,t.
The restatement announcement day is obtained from the GAO [2003]. Abnormal returns
are market-adjusted returns, based on the CRSP equally-weighted market index. Market-
adjusted returns are used because competitors are generally associated with more than one
restatement announcement, which are oftentimes no more than two weeks apart. The CAPM
or the Fama-French three-factor model parameters are therefore difficult to estimate out
of sample. The market-adjusted model has the same ability as the CAPM or the Fama-
French three-factor model to detect abnormal returns (Brown and Warner [1985], Kothari
and Warner [1997]).
Both Panel A and Panel B of Table 5 confirm that restatements announcements convey
news to investors, since competitors’ and restating firms’ cumulative abnormal returns are
significantly negative, as in the literature (Palmrose et al. [2004], Xu et al. [2006], Kravet
and Shevlin [2007], Gleason et al. [2008]). For example, during the three days [−1,+1]
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around the restatement announcement, competitors’ mean cumulative abnormal returns are
−0.34% (Patell Z = −8.80). This translates into an aggregate loss of about 581 million U.S.
dollars.11 Restating firms experience mean cumulative abnormal returns of −8.28% (Patell
Z = −8.16) during [−1,+1], implying an aggregate loss of about 141 million U.S. dollars,
which is about 25% of the competitors’ aggregated loss. Finally, Panel C provides descriptive
statistics on the restatement amount scaled by prior-year total assets (COMPUSTAT #6).
Data on restatement amounts are hand-collected from restatement announcements obtained
via Lexis Nexis. Starting with the 785 sample firm-years, we identify restatement amounts
for 634 firm-years. The average restatement is −9.15% of prior-year assets.
4.2 Changes in investments and restatement news
This section tests whether changes in competitors’ investments following restatement an-
nouncements are related to the three news proxies, using the following setup:
∆Ii,p = βNews + Γ
′C + FixedEffects+ εi,p, (2)




. Period P (P − 1) refers to the three years +1, +2, +3 after
(the three years −1, −2, −3 before) year 0 of the restatement announcement. The variable
Ii,P (Ii,P−1) is average investment during period P (P − 1). We measure average invest-
ment over three years because investment may take time to react to news, as suggested by
Table 4. Investment I is as defined in Section 4.1.1. The variable News captures news
in the restatement, based on the three news proxies: (1) competitors’ abnormal returns at
the restatement announcement, CARi,−τ ,+τ , (2) restating firms’ abnormal returns at the
restatement announcement, CARj,−τ,+τ , and (3) the restatement amount Restatj,t, as de-
fined in Section 4.1.2. The period [−τ ,+τ ] is either [−1,+1] or [−5,+5]. According to
11The 581 million dollar loss is obtained by multiplying each competitor’s market value at the beginning of
τ = −1 with that competitor’s abnormal returns between τ = −1 and τ = +1. The resulting dollar change
in the market value per competitor is then summed across all competitors in the sample.
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Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, changes in competitors’ investments ∆Ii,p following restatement an-
nouncements are related to their abnormal returns CARi,−τ ,+τ , to restating firms’ abnormal
returns CARj,−τ,+τ , and to restatement amounts Restatj,t. Hence, we test the null that
β = 0 against the alternative that β 6= 0.
The vector C captures factors other than news in the restatement that affect changes
in competitors’ investments, and the vector Γ represents the estimated slope coefficients on
these factors. To address the concern that changes in competitors’ investments are driven
by contagion, external financing or the strategic relation between restating firms and com-
petitors, we explicitly control for contagion and external financing, using Hazardi,P and
∆ExtF ini,p, as well as for the strategic relation between restating firms and competitors,
using ∆MSi,p. All controls are explained in the list below (where averages are used for
periods P and P − 1) and detailed in Appendix B.
• The likelihood that a competitor restates, Hazardi,P , directly controls for contagion,
since competitors with lower quality accounting information are more likely to restate.
Contagion can influence competitors’ investments through two channels. First, a com-
petitor with lower quality accounting information may have a higher cost of external
financing (Hribar and Jenkins [2004], Kravet and Shevlin [2007]), and thus invest less.
Second, a competitor with lower quality accounting information may make real deci-
sions that allow it to hide this low quality accounting information (Sadka [2006], Kedia
and Philippon [2007]). Hazardi,P is the estimated probability that a competitor re-
states its financial reports in P . This probability is obtained from a probit model with
the following explanatory variables.
– The quality of corporate governance. A competitor with lower quality corporate
governance is more likely to restate (Kedia and Philippon [2007]). Governance
scores come from Gompers et al. [2003], and the original data are from the Insti-
tutional Investor Research Center (IIRC).
– Competitor size, defined as the natural logarithm of total assets (COMPUSTAT
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#6). A larger competitor may be more likely to restate because of size-related
agency problems.
– Competitor growth, measured by Tobin’s Q and defined as total assets (COM-
PUSTAT #6) plus market value of equity (COMPUSTAT #24 × COMPUSTAT
#199) minus book value of equity (COMPUSTAT #60), all scaled by total as-
sets. A competitor may rely on more aggressive accounting practices when its
investment growth potential is lower.
– A dummy variable that equals 1 if the competitor’s restatement is not the first
restatement in its industry, and 0 otherwise. A competitor’s financial reports may
be subject to higher scrutiny once a restatement has occurred in its industry.
– The change in the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts for restating firms’ one year
ahead earnings during the 45 days after the restatement announcement. The
change in the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts captures increased uncertainty.
We include 4-digit industry and year fixed effects, and estimate the probit regression
on a company level between 1996 and 2002. The estimated coefficients on the following
explanatory variables are significant and positive: the competitor’s size, the dummy
variable that equals 1 if it is not the first restatement in the 4-digit industry and 0 oth-
erwise, and the change in the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts. We use the regression’s
fitted values turned into probabilities as the estimated probability of a restatement.
• The change in a competitor’s external financing, ∆ExtF ini,p, can affect its investments,
since a competitor raising more external financing is more likely to have the necessary
capital for investments. Changes in external financing can be due to various factors,
such as market timing (Baker and Wurgler [2002]) and restatements in the industry
(Hribar and Jenkins [2004], Kravet and Shevlin [2007]). ∆ExtF ini,p is the scaled
change in the external financing,
ExtF ini,P−ExtF ini,P−1
ExtF ini,P−1
. External financing ExtF ini,P is
the sum of equity issues and debt issues in P , divided by total assets (COMPUSTAT
#6) in P − 1, following Baker et al. [2003]. Equity issues in P is the change in
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book equity (COMPUSTAT #60) between P − 1 and P minus the change in retained
earnings (COMPUSTAT #36) between P − 1 and P . Debt issues in P is the change
in assets (COMPUSTAT #6) between P − 1 and P , minus the change in book equity
(COMPUSTAT #60) between P − 1 and P .
• The change in a competitor’s cash, ∆Cashi,p, can affect its investments in two ways.
First, a competitor with more cash faces fewer liquidity constraints for investments,
since it needs less external financing, especially if it has financing constraints (Fazzari
et al. [1988]). Second, a competitor with more cash may have higher agency costs of free




Cash is net income (COMPUSTAT #18) plus depreciation and amortization (COM-
PUSTAT #14), scaled by prior-year total assets (COMPUSTAT #6).
• The change in a competitor’s Tobin’s q, ∆Qi,p, is included because stock prices reflect
the marginal product of capital, and can thus affect investment (Tobin [1969]). ∆Qi,p is
the scaled change in Tobin’s q,
Qi,P−Qi,P−1
Qi,P−1
. Following Chen et al. [2007], Q is total assets
(COMPUSTAT #6) plus market value of equity (COMPUSTAT #24 × COMPUSTAT
#199) minus book value of equity (COMPUSTAT #60), all scaled by total assets.
• The change in a competitor’s market share, ∆MSi,p, may impact its investments be-
cause it reflects changes in the strategic relation between the competitor and the re-
stating firm as well as changes in the competitor’s investment opportunities (Jaffe
[1986], Smit and Ankum [1993]). Furthermore, competition affects agency costs and
uncertainty about economic conditions (Karuna [2007]), both of which can influence




is the ratio of the competitor’s sales (COMPUSTAT #12) to the sales of its 4-digit
SIC industry.12
12Using COMPUSTAT data is problematic to calculate market shares, because COMPUSTAT only con-
siders public companies and exclude private companies. The Census Bureau has market share data for both
public and private firms. However, we cannot use Census Bureau data, because they are reported only every
five years, and so we are not able to compute changes in market shares.
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• The change in a competitor’s size, ∆Sizei,p, may influence its investments because
of factors such as empire-building and diversification (Jensen [1986], Stein [2003]).
Furthermore, a larger competitor is less likely to be affected by information asymme-
try problems and has easier access to capital. ∆Sizei,p is the scaled change in size,
Sizei,P−Sizei,P−1
Sizei,P−1
. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets (COMPUSTAT #6).
• Competitor stock price performance prior to a restatement announcement can influence
its investments because a competitor may time the market when raising capital and
because stock prices reflect investment opportunities (Baker and Wurgler [2002], Baker
et al. [2003]). Stock price performance is defined as buy-and-hold returns over the 120
days preceding the restatement announcement, BHi,120.
Finally, we include company and year fixed effects (in FixedEffects) to control for un-
observable company and time characteristics. Reported standard errors are clustered by
4-digit industry to account for potential within-industry error correlation, and are robust
to heteroscedasticity. Descriptive statistics for the variables in regression (2) are shown in
Table 6 and correlation coefficients in Table 7. Changes in competitors’ investments ∆Ii,p
are significantly correlated with the three news proxies.
The results from estimating equation (2) are shown in Table 8. Columns (1) and (2) con-
sider competitors’ abnormal returns at the restatement announcement, CARi,−τ ,+τ . Columns
(3) and (4) focus on restating firms’ abnormal returns at the restatement announcement,
CARj,−τ,+τ . Column (5) centers on restatement amounts, Restatj,t. The evidence is consis-
tent with our first three hypotheses: changes in competitors’ investments after restatement
announcements are significantly positively related to the three news proxies. For instance,
in column (1), which shows the results for competitors’ abnormal returns cumulated dur-
ing [−1,+1], the coefficient β on the new proxy is 0.338 (t-statistic of 4.11). Economically,
a decrease in competitors’ abnormal returns by one standard deviation (which is 0.025,
from Table 6) is accompanied by a subsequent decline in competitors’ investments of 0.85%
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(= −0.025 × 0.338), which is 5.9% of the mean change in competitor investment of 14.4%.
Overall, the evidence in Table 8 supports our argument that restatements contain news that
cause competitors to subsequently modify their investments.
Our results hold after controlling for other factors that impact competitors’ investments,
especially contagion and external financing (captured by Hazardi,P and ∆ExtF ini,p). The
evidence shows that competitors invest more when they are less likely to restate, their exter-
nal financing rises, their cash growth is higher, and they have more investment opportunities
(as captured by ∆Qi,p).
4.3 Cross-sectional variation
We argue in Hypotheses 4 and 5 that the two proxies based on restating firms are more
likely to reflect news in the restatement about competitors’ projects if the interdependencies
between restating firms and competitors are higher. We capture these interdependencies
using the correlation between competitors and restating firms, and the restating firms’ market
shares. We test the two hypotheses using the following setup:
∆Ii,p = β1NewsR + β2NewsRCorri,j,t−1 + β3NewsRMSj,t−1 (3)
+β4Corri,j,t−1 + β5MSj,t−1 + Γ
′C + FixedEffects+ εi,p.
The variable NewsR is either restating firms’ abnormal returns CARj,−τ,+τ , or the restate-
ment amounts Restatj,t. The variable Corri,j,t−1 is the correlation between competitors’ and
restating firms’ daily raw returns during the year preceding the restatement announcement
year. Panel C of Table 6 shows that competitors’ and restating firms’ returns have an av-
erage correlation of 0.117. We predict in Hypothesis 4 that as this correlation increases,
changes in competitors’ investments ∆Ii,p are more strongly related to the two news proxies
in NewsR. This implies that β2 > 0 if β1 > 0 and β2 < 0 if β1 < 0. For both restating firms’
abnormal returns and the restatement amounts, we make no prediction about the sign of β1,
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and hence no prediction for β2. We therefore test whether β2 = 0 against the alternative
that β2 6= 0. The variable MSj,t−1 captures a restating firm’s market share in its 4-digit
industry, measured using sales (COMPUSTAT #12). Restating firms make up on average
0.6% of their industry’s sales, according to Table 6. Hypothesis 5 predicts that this market
share affects the link between changes in competitors’ investments and the two news proxies
in NewsR. We thus test whether the null that β3 = 0 against the alternative that β3 6= 0.
All other variables are defined as in equation (2).
The results are presented in Table 9. Columns (1) through (3) include only Corri,j,t−1,
columns (4) through (6) consider MSj,t−1 alone, and columns (7) through (9) incorporate
both Corri,j,t−1 and MSj,t−1. While our findings are similar across all columns, we focus on
column (7), where the news proxy is CARj,−1,+1. First, we consider the effect of the corre-
lation Corri,j,t−1. Consistent with Hypothesis 4, the coefficient β2 on the interaction term
NewsRCorri,j,t−1 is significantly positive at 0.177 (t-statistic of 2.07). Economically, when
the correlation Corri,j,t−1 increases by one standard deviation, the sensitivity of competitors’
investments to restating firms’ abnormal returns CARj,−1,+1 rises by about 45%.
13 Next, we
turn to the effect of restating firms’ market share MSj,t−1. Consistent with Hypothesis 5,
the coefficient β3 is significantly different from zero, at 0.144 (t-statistic of 1.97). Econom-
ically, when restating firms’ market shares rise by one standard deviation, the sensitivity
of competitors’ investments to restating firms abnormal returns increases by about 62%.14
Overall, this evidence indicates that when the correlations between restating firms and their
competitors are larger and restating firms’ market shares higher, changes in competitors’
investments are more strongly related to the two news proxies in NewsR. The correlations
between competitors and restating firms as well as the restating firms’ market shares thus
13At the average correlation between restating firms and their competitors of Corri,j,t−1 = 0.117 and
at the average restating firms’ market share of MSj,t−1 = 0.006 (from Table 6), competitors’ investment
has a sensitivity of 0.011 + 0.177 × 0.117 + 0.144 × 0.006 = 0.033 to restating firms’ abnormal returns
CARj,−1,+1. When the correlation between competitors and restating firms increases by one standard
deviation to 0.117 + 0.083 = 0.200, the sensitivity of competitors’ investments to restating firms’ abnormal
returns CARj,−1,+1 rises to 0.011 + 0.177× 0.200 + 0.144× 0.006 = 0.047.
14When the market share rises by one standard deviation from its average of 0.006 to 0.006+0.140 = 0.146,
the sensitivity of competitors’ investments to restating firms’ abnormal returns increases from 0.033 to
0.011 + 0.177× 0.117 + 0.144× 0.146 = 0.053.
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affect the extent to which NewsR captures news in restatements about competitors’ projects.
4.4 Horserace regressions
We examine the relative performance of each one of the three news proxies, using the fol-
lowing regression.
∆Ii,p = β1CARi,−5,+5 + β2CARj,−5,+5 + β3Restatj,t + Γ
′C (4)
+FixedEffects+ εi,p,
where all variables are defined as in equation (2). For brevity, we display the results for
cumulative abnormal returns measured over the [−5,+5] interval; the findings are similar
when we focus on the [−1,+1] interval.
Table 10 shows the findings. We focus on column (4) which includes all three news proxies,
and provides two insights. First, competitors’ and restating firms’ abnormal returns as well
as the restatement amounts are significantly positively related to competitors’ subsequent
investments. Our three news proxies thus appear to capture not the same but different
information about the restatement. It is in fact possible that competitors’ and restating
firms’ abnormal returns do more than just capture news in the restatement, and provide
new information to competitors about the value of their projects. Extant evidence indeed
suggests that stock prices impound information from which companies learn for their invest-
ment decisions (Durnev et al. [2004], Chen et al. [2007]). Second, competitors’ abnormal
returns have the strongest relation of all three proxies to subsequent changes in competitors’
investments, both economically and statistically. We conclude that competitors’ abnormal
returns represent the most powerful of our three news proxies.
5 Sensitivity analysis
This section discusses the sensitivity of the main results to various research settings.
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5.1 Investment measure




the [−3,+3] period. Specifically, we average a competitor’s scaled investment over the three
years +1, +2, +3 after the restatement announcement year 0 to obtain Ii,P . Similarly, we
average a competitor’s scaled investment over the three years −1, −2, −3 before year 0
to obtain Ii,P−1. We use various intervals other than the [−3,+3] period, that is [−1,+1],
[−2,+2], [−5,+5], and our results hold.




ways. First, rather than using the raw scaled change in investment ∆Ii,p, we rely on (1) the
benchmark-adjusted scaled change in investment, described in Section 4.1.1, (2) the scaled




, where A are total assets (COMPUSTAT #6), and (4) the level of
the competitor’s total assets,
Ai,P−Ai,P−1
Ai,P−1
.15 Second, our investment measure I does not in-
clude Sales, General and Administrative (SG&A) expenses, because these expenses are often
considered operational outlays rather than capital investments (Armstrong et al. [2006]).
We modify I to also include SG&A expenses (COMPUSTAT #189), following Baker et al.
[2003]. SG&A expenses may create intangible assets because they include expenditures such
as those for product promotion and customer satisfaction (Banker et al. [2006]). Moreover,
the components of SG&A expenses vary amongst companies and industries (Mintz [1994],
Lazere [1995]). Third, we exclude the R&D expense from our investment measure I, follow-
ing Chen et al. [2007]. Our results hold with these alternative investment measures.




where E is total employment (COMPUSTAT #29), scaled by prior-year total assets (COM-
PUSTAT #6), following Kedia and Philippon [2007]. Our results are in general weaker than
those for other investment measures. This is because we are not able to adequately control
for other factors that determine a competitor’s employment decisions, such as changes in rel-
15In case (4), we do not include the percentage change in assets, ∆Sizei,p, as a control in the regressions.
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ative costs of factors of production. Furthermore, news in restatements may not important
enough to justify large changes in a competitor’s employment policies.
5.2 News proxies
One of our three news proxies is the scaled restatement amount, Restatj,t. This measure
assumes that the competitor expects other firms in its industry not to restate, otherwise not
all information in the restatement amount is news. A competitor may expect a non-zero
restatement, for instance if restatements occur in waves. Consistent with this possibility,
our discussion of the Hazardi,P variable suggests that a company is more likely to restate
if there has already been a restatement in its industry. If not all of the information in the
restatement is news, the competitor will put less weight on the restatement in its investment
decision (all else being equal), as suggested in equation (1). Our estimated slope coefficient
on the simple restatement amount may capture this effect, assuming that the weight put
on the restatement amount is the same across all competitors. This assumption may not
hold. To address this concern, we use the scaled restatement adjusted for the average scaled
restatement of firms in the same 4-digit industry as restating firms. Our results hold with
the industry-adjusted restatement amount, except for the last column in Table 10, where
the coefficient on the industry-adjusted restatement loses statistical significance.
We argue that the two proxies based on restating firms are more likely to capture news
in restatements about competitors’ projects if the interdependencies between competitors
and restating firms are stronger. One of our measures of these interdependencies is the
correlation of their stock returns. We use two different measures, following the discussion
in Section 2.3.2. First, we rely on the covariance between restating firms’ and competitors’
stock returns, scaled by the variance of restating firms’ stock returns. The covariance and
the variance are measured using daily raw returns over the year preceding the sample year.
Second, we use the covariance between the restating firm’s earnings and the competitor’s
cash flows, scaled by the variance of the restating firm’s earnings. The covariance and the
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variance are measure using ten annual data points prior to the sample year. We lose 25% of
our sample because of this data requirement. We redo the tests in Table 9 using these two
scaled covariance measures and our results hold. Our findings are weaker with the scaled
covariance measure based on cash flows and earnings due to the reduction in sample size.
Our cross-sectional tests in Table 9 use the restating firms’ market share, calculated
using COMPUSTAT data. Since COMPUSTAT does not have the entire universe of firms
but only publicly traded firms, some industries may be disproportionately represented in
COMPUSTAT, which could lead to incorrect market shares. To address this concern, we use
U.S. Census Bureau data, since they include both private and public firms. Census Bureau
data are reported every five years (i.e. 1992, 1997, and 2002) and are aggregated across firms.
Hence we cannot focus on restating firms alone. We thus use the 4-firm concentration ratio,
which is available for manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries on a 4-digit level.
Moreover, we use the Herfindahl index, which is available only for manufacturing industries.
Our results are consistent with what we find in Table 9, and indicate that when industries
are more concentrated, news proxies based on restating firms are more strongly related to
changes in competitors’ investments.
5.3 Other tests
Outliers can affect the empirical results. We use the method in Hadi [1992] to detect outliers.
In addition, all regressions are re-estimated after winsorizing the main variables at the 1%
and 99% levels. Furthermore, we calculate clustered standard errors by company, rather than
by industry. Next, we drop financial and banking industries (which represent less than 5% of
the sample), since accounting data for these industries are not widely available, which may
affect regressions relying on accounting-based control variables. Moreover, we modify two
control variables. First, rather than the change in assets ∆Sizei,p, we use the level of assets
Sizei,P−1 as a control for size. Second, instead of the change in the competitor’s market share
∆MSi,p as a control for the strategic relations between competitors and restating firms, we
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use the restating firm’s market share as well as the correlation between the competitor’s and
the restating firm’s stock returns during the year preceding the sample year. In all of the
above tests, the results of our study hold. Moveover, they are not driven by any particular
industry; they remain unaltered if any 2-digit SIC industry is removed from the sample.
6 Conclusion
This study examines whether restatements convey news about the investment projects of
restating firms’ competitors. If so, restatement announcements cause competitors to update
their beliefs about the value of these projects, and to modify their subsequent investment
decisions. We therefore predict that subsequent changes in competitors’ investments are
associated with news in the restatements. Overall, the evidence supports our contention.
First, competitors significantly reduce their investments starting in the year of the restate-
ment announcement, compared to benchmark companies. Second, changes in competitors’
investments following restatement announcements are significantly linked to three proxies for
news in the restatement: (1) competitors’ abnormal returns at the restatement announce-
ment, (2) restating firms’ abnormal returns at the restatement announcement, and (3) the
restatement amounts. The extent to which the two latter measures are adequate news proxies
depends on the interdependencies between restating firms and their competitors. Accord-
ingly, we document that the link between subsequent changes in competitors’ investments
and restating firms’ abnormal returns as well as the restatement amounts is stronger in two
circumstances: (1) when the correlation between restating firms and competitors is more
important, and (2) when the restating firms’ market share is higher.
Our work indicates that there is an information transfer from restating firms to their com-
petitors at restatement announcements, involving information about competitors’ projects.
This finding suggests a novel explanation for the negative abnormal returns that competitors
of restating firms experience at restatement announcements. Specifically, competitors’ abnor-
mal returns appear at least partly driven by news in the restatement about their projects.
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This explanation does not preclude competitors’ abnormal returns from also impounding
other news, such as information about the quality of their financial reports. We conclude
that restatements of financial reports have direct implications for corporate investments, and
affect the allocation of resources in the economy.
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A Posterior for the unknown profitability θ
This appendix provides the proof that the posterior for the unknown payoff parameter θ of the


















The investment It pays off P˜t = p˜tf(It) at the end of t, with t = 1, 2, where f(·) is a known
and concave function. The variable p˜t is normally distributed as N(θ, σ
2
ǫ ), and can be written
as p˜t = θ + ǫ˜t, where ǫ˜t is normally distributed as N(0, σ
2
ǫ) and ǫ˜1 is independent from ǫ˜2. The
parameter θ is unknown, all other parameters are known. At the start of t = 1, the competitor
has a prior about the unknown θ that is normally distributed as N(θ1, σ
2
1). After the realization
of P˜1 at the end of t = 1, the competitor updates its prior about θ, and obtains a posterior that is
normally distributed as N(θ2, σ
2














[1989]). This posterior reflects the competitor’s information set Ω2 at the beginning of t = 2.
Shortly after the start of t = 2, and before the optimal investment decision in t = 2 is made,
a restatement occurs, which is a noisy signal of the unknown θ, and can be written as r˜ = γθ + e˜,
where e˜ is normally distributed as N(0, σ2e) and independent from ǫt. The variance σ
2
e and the
parameter γ are known. The scaled restatement R˜ = θ + e˜
γ
is normally distributed as N(θ, σ2),




. The probability density function (henceforth “pdf”) for θ, given R and Ω2, is






] and the pdf for R given θ is p(R|θ) = 1√
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)σ2τ . Substitute both preceding expressions into the posterior pdf
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Since a density must integrate to 1, it follows that:
p(θ|R,Ω2) = 1√
2Πσ2τ























B Definitions of Variables
Subscript j refers to a restating firm. Subscript i refers to a competitor in the same 4-digit SIC code as
restating firm j during the fiscal year t of the restatement announcement. Restating firms are excluded
from the sample of competitors. The variables are listed in alphabetical order. The subscript p refers to the
difference between period P and period P − 1. Period P refers to the three years +1, +2, +3 after year 0
of the restatement announcement, while period P − 1 refers to the three years −1, −2, −3 before year 0.
Averages are used for periods P and P − 1. Period [−τ ,+τ ] refer to number of days before and after the
restatement announcement by a restating firm; it ranges from −1 to +1 or from −5 to +5. Accounting data
is from COMPUSTAT, and stock price data from CRSP.
• BHi,120: Competitor i’s buy-and-hold returns during the 120 days prior to the restatement announce-
ment.
• CARi,−τ,+τ : Competitor i’s cumulative abnormal returns, calculated as market-adjusted returns
cumulated during [−τ ,+τ ].
• CARj,d−τ,d+τ : Restating firm j’s cumulative abnormal returns, calculated as market-adjusted returns
cumulated during [−τ ,+τ ].
• Corri,j,t−1: correlation between competitor i’s and restating firm j’s daily raw returns during the
fiscal year preceding the fiscal year of the restatement announcement.
• ∆Cashi,p: Rate of change in competitor i’s cash, Cashi,P−Cashi,P−1Cashi,P−1 . Cash is net income (COMPUS-
TAT #18) plus depreciation and amortization (COMPUSTAT #14), scaled by prior-year total assets
(COMPUSTAT #6).
• ∆ExtF ini,p: Rate of change in competitor i’s external financing, ExtFini,P−ExtFini,P−1ExtFini,P−1 . External
financing ExtF ini,P is the sum of equity issues and debt issues in P , divided by total assets (COM-
PUSTAT #6) in P − 1, following Baker et al. [2003]. Equity issues in P is the change in book equity
(COMPUSTAT #60) between P − 1 and P minus the change in retained earnings (COMPUSTAT
#36) between P − 1 and P . Debt issues in P is the change in assets (COMPUSTAT #6) between
P − 1 and P minus the change in book equity (COMPUSTAT #60) between P − 1 and P .
• ∆Ii,p: Rate of change in competitor i’s investment I, Ii,P−Ii,P−1Ii,P−1 . Investment I is capital expenditure
(COMPUSTAT #128) plus R&D expense (COMPUSTAT #46), scaled by prior-year total assets
(COMPUSTAT #6).
• ∆MSi,p: Rate of change in competitor i’s market share, MSi,P−MSi,P−1MSi,P−1 . The market share is the
ratio of the competitor’s sales (COMPUSTAT #12) to the sales of its 4-digit SIC industry.
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• ∆Qi,p: Rate of change in competitor i’s Tobin’s q, Qi,P−Qi,P−1Qi,P−1 . Following Chen et al. [2007], Q is
assets (COMPUSTAT #6) plus market value of equity (COMPUSTAT #24 × COMPUSTAT #199)
minus book value of equity (COMPUSTAT #60), all scaled by total assets.
• ∆Sizei,p: Rate of change in competitor i’s size, Sizei,P−Sizei,P−1Sizei,P−1 . Size is the natural logarithm of
total assets (COMPUSTAT #6).
• Hazardi,P : Estimated probability that competitor i restates its financial reports in P , obtained from
a probit model with the following explanatory variables: change in the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts
around the restatement announcement, quality of corporate governance, competitor size, competitor
growth, a dummy variable that equals 1 if it is not the first restatement in the 4-digit industry and
0 otherwise, industry and year fixed effects, following Kedia and Philippon [2007]. This regression is
estimated on a competitor level between 1996 and 2002, using maximum likelihood. The regression’s
fitted values (turned into probabilities) are used as the estimated probability of a restatement.
• MSj,t−1: Market share of restating firm j in fiscal year t−1 prior to the fiscal year of the restatement.
The market share is the ratio of the restating firm’s sales to the sales of its 4-digit SIC industry.
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Table 1: Sample selection for competitors of restating firms, from 1997 to 2002
Firms Firm-years
GAO database, 1997 - 2002 839 916
No data on CRSP or COMPUSTAT (81) (82)
758 836
Fiscal year changes (45) (51)
Final sample of restatement firms 713 785
Final sample of competitors at the 4-digit SIC level 8,500 73,667
This table shows the sample selection details for the competitors of firms that announce a
restatement of their financial reports between 1997 and 2002. Restatements are from the
General Accounting Office (GAO) [2003]. Competitors are in the same fiscal year and 4-digit
industry as restating firms. Restating firms are excluded from the sample of competitors.
Numbers in parentheses are observations that are dropped.
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Table 2: Number and percentage of sample restatements by 2-digit SIC industry
SIC Code Industry Number Percent (%)
(1) (2)
10 Metal Mining 3 0.38
13 Oil And Gas Extraction 11 1.40
14 Mining And Quarrying Of Nonmetallic Minerals, Except Fuels 3 0.38
15 Building Construction General Contractors And Operative Builders 3 0.38
16 Heavy Construction Other Than Building Construction Contractors 4 0.51
17 Construction Special Trade Contractors 2 0.25
20 Food And Kindred Products 15 1.91
21 Tobacco Products 1 0.13
22 Textile Mill Products 2 0.25
23 Apparel And Other Finished Products Made From Fabrics And Similar Materials 7 0.89
25 Furniture And Fixtures 6 0.76
26 Paper And Allied Products 6 0.76
27 Printing, Publishing, And Allied Industries 11 1.40
28 Chemicals And Allied Products 42 5.35
29 Petroleum Refining And Related Industries 2 0.25
30 Rubber And Miscellaneous Plastics Products 7 0.89
32 Leather And Leather Products 6 0.76
33 Stone, Clay, Glass, And Concrete Products 10 1.27
34 Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery And Transportation Equipment 5 0.64
35 Industrial And Commercial Machinery And Computer Equipment 60 7.64
36 Electronic And Other Electrical Equipment And Components, Except Computer Equipment 55 7.01
37 Transportation Equipment 14 1.78
38 Measuring, Analyzing, And Controlling Instruments 49 6.24
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 6 0.76
41 Railroad Transportation 1 0.13
42 Motor Freight Transportation And Warehousing 3 0.38
44 Water Transportation 1 0.13
45 Transportation By Air 7 0.89
47 Transportation Services 3 0.38
48 Communications 28 3.57
49 Electric, Gas, And Sanitary Services 21 2.68
50 Wholesale Trade-durable Goods 12 1.53
51 Wholesale Trade-non-durable Goods 11 1.40
52 Building Materials, Hardware, Garden Supply, And Mobile Home Dealers 1 0.13
53 General Merchandise Stores 9 1.15
54 Food Stores 6 0.76
55 Automotive Dealers And Gasoline Service Stations 4 0.51
56 Apparel And Accessory Stores 14 1.78
57 Home Furniture, Furnishings, And Equipment Stores 7 0.89
58 Eating And Drinking Places 6 0.76
59 Miscellaneous Retail 12 1.53
60 Depository Institutions 42 5.35
61 Non-depository Credit Institutions 12 1.53
62 Security And Commodity Brokers, Dealers, Exchanges, And Services 9 1.15
63 Insurance Carriers 21 2.68
64 Insurance Agents, Brokers, And Service 1 0.13
65 Real Estate 2 0.25
67 Holding And Other Investment Offices 18 2.29
70 Hotels, Rooming Houses, Camps, And Other Lodging Places 4 0.51
72 Personal Services 1 0.13
73 Business Services 138 17.58
76 Miscellaneous Repair Services 2 0.25
78 Motion Pictures 7 0.89
79 Amusement And Recreation Services 8 1.02
80 Health Services 15 1.91
82 Educational Services 5 0.64
83 Social Services 3 0.38
87 Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management, And Related Services 15 1.91
99 Nonclassifiable Establishments 6 0.76
Total 785 100.00
“Number” pertains to the number of sample restatements; “Percent (%)” refers to the percentage of sample restate-
ments.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for sample restatements
Number Percent (%)










SEC/FASB/Other agency 110 14.01
Auditor 59 7.52
Other external 5 0.64
Unattributed 281 35.80
Total 785 100.00
Panel C. Accounting issues
Revenue recognition 305 38.85
Restructuring, assets, or inventory 107 13.63
Cost or expense 98 12.48
Acquisitions and mergers 47 5.99
Securities related 42 5.35
Reclassification 32 4.08
IPR&D 30 3.82
Related-party transactions 26 3.31
Loan loss 9 1.15




This table shows descriptive statistics for the 785 sample restatements, from the General Accounting Office (GAO) [2003].
“Number” pertains to the number of sample restatements; “Percent (%)” refers to the percentage of sample restatements. Panel
A reports the calendar year when the restatement is announced. Panel B displays the party that prompted the restatement.
Panel C shows the accounts that are restated, as detailed by the GAO for the following items. “Revenue recognition” refers
to improper revenue accounting and includes instances in which revenue was improperly recognized, questionable revenues
were recognized, or any other number of mistakes or improprieties were made that led to misreported revenue. “Restructuring,
assets, or inventory” is for asset impairments, errors relating to accounting treatment of investments, timing of asset write-downs,
goodwill, restructuring activity and inventory valuation, and inventory quantity issues. “Cost or expense” refers to improper
cost accounting and includes instances of improperly recognizing costs or expenses, improperly capitalizing expenditures, any
other number of mistakes or improprieties that led to misreported costs, improper treatment of tax liabilities, income tax
reserves, and other tax-related items. “Acquisitions and mergers” is for acquisitions or mergers that were improperly accounted
for or not accounted for at all, including cases in which the wrong accounting method was used or losses or gains related to the
acquisition were understated or overstated. This category does not include in-process research and development or restatements
for mergers, acquisitions, and discontinued operations when appropriate accounting methods were employed. “Securities related”
refers to improper accounting for derivatives, warrants, stock options, and other convertible securities. “Reclassification” is for
improperly classified accounting items, such as debt payments being classified as investments. “IPR&D” refers to instances in
which improper accounting methodologies were used to value in-process research and development at the time of an acquisition.
“Related-party transactions” is for inadequate disclosure or improper accounting of revenues, expenses, debts, or assets involving
transactions or relationships with related parties, including those involving special-purpose entities. “Other” refers to any
restatement not covered by the above listed categories. Cases included in this category include restatements due to inadequate
loan-loss reserves, delinquent loans, loan write-offs, improper accounting for bad loans and restatements due to fraud, and
accounting irregularities that were left unspecified. The GAO [2003] does not give explicit descriptions for the following items:
“Loan loss”, “Tax related”, and “Unspecified”. If a restatement involves more than one account, we use the first account
indicated by the GAO [2003].
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Table 4: Annual changes in competitors’ investments around restatement announcements
Year t relative to the Number Mean p-value for Median p-value for
restatement announcement of obs. (%) Student t-statistic (%) Wilcoxon statistic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Raw investment changes, ∆I, between t− 1 and t
-5 41,623 9.9 0.000 7.1 0.000
-4 43,874 6.8 0.000 8.1 0.000
-3 45,212 24.3 0.000 13.7 0.000
-2 48,902 18.7 0.000 11.6 0.000
-1 50,823 24.6 0.000 13.8 0.000
0 51,918 12.7 0.000 7.0 0.000
+1 49,101 -4.3 0.000 -5.4 0.000
+2 47,183 2.5 0.000 1.7 0.021
+3 44,902 -15.0 0.000 -19.6 0.000
+4 41,311 5.6 0.000 4.6 0.000
+5 40,311 9.4 0.000 5.6 0.000
Panel B. Benchmark-adjusted investment changes, ∆I ′, between t− 1 and t
-5 41,623 5.3 0.000 2.3 0.000
-4 43,874 6.9 0.000 4.2 0.000
-3 45,212 9.0 0.000 -1.0 0.117
-2 48,902 -6.0 0.000 0.4 0.280
-1 50,823 17.5 0.000 6.0 0.000
0 51,918 -5.6 0.000 -7.2 0.000
+1 49,101 -5.2 0.000 -6.5 0.000
+2 47,183 -2.6 0.000 -3.2 0.000
+3 44,902 -16.2 0.000 -12.7 0.000
+4 41,730 8.0 0.000 2.6 0.000
+5 40,311 1.1 0.000 1.7 0.000
This table shows descriptive statistics for the annual changes in competitors’ investments
around the year of the restatement announcement (year t = 0). Competitors are in the
same fiscal year and 4-digit industry as restating firms. Restating firms are excluded from
the sample of competitors. Panel A displays raw scaled changes in competitors’ investments
between two subsequent years t− 1 and t, ∆I = It−It−1
It−1
. Investment I is capital expenditure
(COMPUSTAT #128) plus R&D expense (COMPUSTAT #46), scaled by prior-year total
assets (COMPUSTAT #6). Panel B shows benchmark-adjusted scaled changes in competi-
tors’ investments ∆I ′, defined as the difference between raw annual changes in investments
for competitors and for benchmark firms that belong to 4-digit SIC industries without a
restatement between 1997 and 2002. The Student t and the Wilcoxon statistics test the
hypothesis that the mean and median changes in competitors’ investments are significantly
different from zero.
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Table 5: Proxies for news in the restatement
Panel A. Competitors’ abnormal returns at the restatement announcement
Period Number Mean Median Generalized
[−τ ,+τ ] of obs. (%) (%) Positive:Negative Patell Z Sign Z
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
[−10,+10] 67,443 −1.08 −1.05 30,451:36,992*** −20.68*** −5.11***
[−5,+5] 67,440 −0.79 −0.54 30,248:37,192*** −15.56*** −6.67***
[−3,+3] 67,439 −0.48 −0.32 30,379:37,060*** −11.82*** −5.65***
[−1,+1] 67,436 −0.34 −0.29 30,754:36,682*** −8.80*** −2.75***
[−3, 0] 67,435 −0.44 −0.34 30,464:36,971*** −11.33*** −4.98***
[−1, 0] 67,434 −0.26 −0.24 30,624:36,810*** −7.96*** −3.74***
Panel B. Restating firms’ abnormal returns at the restatement announcement
Period Number Mean Median Generalized
[−τ ,+τ ] of obs. (%) (%) Positive:Negative Patell Z Sign Z
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
[−10,+10] 698 −13.10 −7.69 231:467 −8.38*** −5.76***
[−5,+5] 698 −10.40 −5.55 225:473 −8.31*** −5.62***
[−3,+3] 698 −9.20 −7.16 222:476 −8.16*** −5.57***
[−1,+1] 694 −8.28 −3.85 221:473 −8.16*** −5.55***
[−3, 0] 693 −8.40 −6.33 233:460 −8.07*** −5.52***
[−1, 0] 693 −8.20 −6.12 240:453 −7.89*** −5.47***
Panel C. Scaled restatement amounts
Number Mean Median Standard Minimum Maximum
of obs. (%) (%) Deviation (%) (%) (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
634 −9.15 −3.41 12.19 −19.39 16.81
This table shows descriptive statistics for the three proxies for news in the restatement: (1) com-
petitors’ abnormal returns at the restatement announcement (in Panel A), (2) restating firms’
abnormal returns at the restatement announcement (in Panel B) and (3) the scaled restatement
amount (in Panel C). Competitors are in the same fiscal year and 4-digit industry as restating
firms. Restating firms are excluded from the sample of competitors. Abnormal returns are market-
adjusted returns, based on the CRSP equally-weighted market index. The restatement amount is
scaled by prior-year total assets (COMPUSTAT #6). The Patell Z test is a parametric test of
whether abnormal returns are zero. The Generalized Sign Z is a nonparametric test of whether the
proportion of positive or negative abnormal returns is different in the sample period than in the es-
timation period. The period [−τ ,+τ ] measures the day relative to the restatement announcement.
*** (**) [*] denotes significance at the 1% (5%) [10%] level.
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics for restating firms j and their competitors i
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max Number
Panel A. Competitors
∆Ii,p -0.144 0.407 -0.863 -0.197 0.403 51,918
CARi,−1,+1 -0.003 0.025 -0.151 -0.003 0.207 67,436
CARi,−5,+5 -0.008 0.056 -0.278 -0.005 0.340 67,440
Hazardi,P 0.032 0.009 0.001 0.014 0.124 42,450
∆ExtF ini,p 0.123 0.009 0.001 0.073 0.124 46,396
∆Cashi,p -0.147 0.999 -0.783 -0.083 1.832 51,973
∆Qi,p -0.025 0.324 -0.553 -0.025 0.626 53,280
∆MSi,p 0.442 1.447 -0.847 0.067 9.437 62,460
∆Sizei,p 0.239 2.688 -0.986 0.088 7.809 62,400
BHi,120 0.056 0.367 -0.659 0.025 1.789 62,460
Panel B. Restating firms
Restatj,t -0.092 0.122 -0.194 -0.034 0.168 634
CARj,−1,+1 -0.083 0.177 -0.486 -0.039 0.472 694
CARj,−5,+5 -0.103 0.256 -0.362 -0.056 1.361 698
MSj,t−1 0.006 0.140 0.000 0.007 0.092 672
Panel C. Competitors and Restating firms
Corri,j,t−1 0.117 0.083 0.000 0.107 0.476 51,434
This table presents descriptive statistics for competitors of restating firms (Panel A), re-
stating firms (Panel B), and both competitors and restating firms (Panel C). Competitor i
belongs to the same 4-digit industry as restating firm j in the fiscal year t of the restatement
announcement. Restating firms are excluded from the sample of competitors. The subscript
p refers to the scaled change in the variable between period P (the three years +1, +2, +3
after the restatement announcement) and period P − 1 (the three years −1, −2, −3 before
the restatement announcement). All variables are defined in Appendix B.
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Table 7: Pearson correlation coefficients for restating firms j and their competitors i
CARi,−1,+1 CARi,−5,+5 CARj,−1,+1 CARj,−5,+5 Restatj,t Hazardi,P ∆ExtF ini,p ∆Cashi,p ∆Qi,p ∆MSi,p ∆Sizei,p BHi,120 Corri,j,t−1 MSj,t−1
∆Ii,p 0.031*** 0.045*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** -0.17*** -0.24*** 0.02*** 0.14*** -0.20*** -0.165*** -0.01*** -0.11*** 0.05***
CARi,−1,+1 0.64*** 0.06*** 0.11*** 0.06*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.01*** -0.06*** -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.04*** -0.02*** 0.02***
CARi,−5,+5 0.06*** 0.21*** 0.02*** -0.00 -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.07*** -0.01* 0.01** 0.12*** -0.02*** 0.03***
CARj,−1,+1 0.57*** 0.09*** -0.01*** -0.03*** 0.01*** -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.02*** 0.00 -0.02*** 0.03**
CARj,−5,+5 0.54*** -0.02*** -0.01** 0.00 -0.03*** -0.01** 0.00 0.00 -0.02*** -0.01*
Restatj,t 0.08*** -0.01** 0.01 0.02*** -0.01** 0.00 0.00 -0.02*** -0.01*
Hazardi,P 0.05*** -0.03*** -0.10*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.08***
∆ExtF ini,p -0.05*** 0.23*** 0.43*** 0.41*** 0.13*** 0.17*** -0.07***
∆Cashi,p -0.01*** 0.03*** -0.08*** -0.05*** 0.02*** -0.00
∆Qi,p 0.08*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.02*** -0.02***
∆MSi,p 0.31*** 0.08*** 0.13*** -0.01***
∆Sizei,p -0.16*** -0.08*** -0.03***
BHi,120 0.06*** -0.07***
Corri,j,t−1 -0.07***
This table presents the Pearson correlation coefficients for main variables. Competitor i belongs to the same 4-digit industry as
restating firm j in the fiscal year t of the restatement announcement. Restating firms are excluded from the sample of competitors.
The subscript p refers to the difference between period P (the three years +1, +2, +3 after the restatement announcement) and
period P − 1 (the three years −1, −2, −3 before the restatement announcement). All variables are defined in Appendix B. ***
(**) [*] denotes significance at the 1% (5%) [10%] level.
51
Table 8: Changes in competitors’ investments ∆Ii,p as a function of the news in the restate-
ment, News
∆Ii,p = βNews+ γ1Hazardi,P + γ2∆ExtF ini,p + γ3∆Cashi,p + γ4∆Qi,p + γ5∆MSi,p
+γ6∆Sizei,p + γ7BHi,120 + FixedEffects+ εi,p
News =
CARi,−1,+1 CARi,−5,+5 CARj,−1,+1 CARj,−5,+5 Restatj,t
Coefficient Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
β News 0.338*** 0.191*** 0.032*** 0.026*** 0.043***
(4.11) (4.59) (3.16) (3.02) (2.88)
γ1 Hazardi,P -5.288*** -5.603*** -20.851*** -20.781*** -20.835**
(-17.92) (-14.83) (-19.33) (-19.27) (-19.32)
γ2 ∆ExtF ini,p 0.157*** 0.163*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.056***
(22.85) (23.62) (9.79) (9.66) (9.78)
γ3 ∆Cashi,p 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016***
(7.01) (7.33) (9.95) (10.07) (9.95)
γ4 ∆Qi,p 0.185*** 0.200*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.066***
(30.05) (31.40) (14.64) (14.57) (14.64)
γ5 ∆MSi,p -0.006** -0.005* 0.000 0.000 0.000
(-2.16) (-1.82) (-0.13) (-0.17) (-0.13)
γ6 ∆Sizei,p 0.011*** 0.011*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(7.58) (7.38) (-0.86) (-0.89) (-0.87)
γ7 BHi,120 0.015*** 0.012* -0.007* -0.007* -0.007*
(2.64) (1.85) (-1.77) (-1.77) (-1.80)
Firm fixed effects s s s s s
Year fixed effects s s s s s
Adjusted R2 54.3% 54.4% 54.1% 54.1% 54.1%
# of observations 27,590 27,590 24,345 24,455 24,013
∆Ii,p is the scaled change in the investment I of competitor i,
IP−IP−1
IP−1
. Competitors are in the same fiscal year and
4-digit industry as restating firms. Restating firms are excluded from the sample of competitors. Ii,P (Ii,P−1) is the
average investment during period P (P − 1). Investment I is capital expenditure (COMPUSTAT #128) plus R&D
expense (COMPUSTAT #46), scaled by prior-year total assets (COMPUSTAT #6). Period P is the three years +1,
+2, +3 after the year 0 of the restatement announcement, while period P − 1 is the three years −1, −2, −3 before
year 0. News is either competitors’ abnormal returns at the restatement announcement (CARi,−1,+1,CARi,−5,+5),
restating firms’ abnormal returns at the restatement announcement (CARj,−1,+1,CARj,−5,+5), or the scaled restate-
ment amount Restatj,t. All variables are defined in Appendix B. The regressions are estimated from 1997 to 2002 in
the pooled cross-section, and use firm and year fixed effects (in FixedEffects). The t-statistics in all regressions are
based on standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity and are clustered by 4-digit SIC industry (to control
for within-industry error correlation). *** (**) [*] denotes significance at the 1% (5%) [10%] level. “s” (“ns”) stands
for significant (non-significant).
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Table 9: The impact of the correlation Corri,j,t−1 between restating firms and their competitors, and of the restating firms’ market
share MSj,t−1 on the relation between changes in competitors’ investments ∆Ii,p and restating firms abnormal returns CARj,−τ,+τ
as well as the restatement amount Restatj,t
∆Ii,p = β1NewsR + β2NewsRCorri,j,t−1 + β3NewsRMSj,t−1 + β4Corri,j,t−1 + β5MSj,t−1 + γ1Hazardi,P
+γ2∆ExtF ini,p + γ3∆Cashi,p + γ4∆Qi,p + γ5∆MSi,p + γ6∆Sizei,p + γ7BHi,120 + FixedEffects+ εi,p
NewsR = NewsR = NewsR =
CARj,−1,+1 CARj,−5,+5 Restatj,t CARj,−1,+1 CARj,−5,+5 Restatj,t CARj,−1,+1 CARj,−5,+5 Restatj,t
Coefficient Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
β1 NewsR 0.028*** 0.022** 0.014 0.031*** 0.021* 0.041*** 0.011 0.027 0.016
(3.30) (2.27) (1.08) (3.26) (1.76) (2.88) (0.67) (0.63) (0.27)
β2 NewsRCorri,j,t−1 0.141** 0.157*** 0.154** 0.177** 0.164*** 0.133**
(2.31) (2.76) (2.33) (2.07) (2.83) (2.39)
β3 NewsRMSj,t−1 0.143*** 0.149** 0.147* 0.144* 0.160* 0.164**
(2.57) (2.44) (1.86) (1.97) (1.63) (2.05)
β4 Corri,j,t−1 -0.114*** -0.115*** -0.105*** -0.138*** -0.102*** -0.113**
(-3.32) (-4.09) (-3.62) (-3.31) (-2.91) (-2.42)
β5 MSj,t−1 0.036 0.029 0.045 0.079** 0.083** 0.079**
(0.69) (0.56) (0.87) (2.22) (2.32) (2.22)
γ1 Hazardi,P -22.370*** -22.276*** -22.337*** -20.871*** -20.816*** -20.906*** -24.829*** -24.731*** -24.775***
(-19.58) (-19.49) (-19.56) (-19.34) (-19.30) (-19.35) (-20.03) (-19.95) (-20.00)
γ2 ∆ExtF ini,p 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.049*** 0.048*** 0.049***
(8.85) (8.75) (8.85) (9.77) (9.66) (9.77) (7.86) (7.74) (7.86)
γ3 ∆Cashi,p 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016***
(10.72) (10.84) (10.72) (9.96) (10.09) (9.96) (9.38) (9.56) (9.38)
γ4 ∆Qi,p 0.064*** 0.063*** 0.064*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.055***
(13.58) (13.48) (13.59) (14.55) (14.48) (4.49) (11.33) (11.23) (11.33)
γ5 ∆MSi,p 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.003 0.002 0.003
(0.29) (0.24) (0.29) (-0.14) (-0.21) (-0.11) (0.97) (0.90) (0.98)
γ6 ∆Sizei,p -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(-0.86) (-0.87) (-0.86) (-0.85) (-0.86) (-0.87) (-0.03) (-0.04) (-0.04)
γ7 BHi,120 -0.007* -0.007* -0.007* -0.007* -0.007* -0.007* -0.007* -0.007* -0.007*
(-1.78) (-1.78) (-1.80) (-1.80) (-1.76) (-1.78) (-1.76) (-1.74) (-1.77)
Firm fixed effects s s s s s s s s s
Year fixed effects s s s s s s s s s
Adjusted R2 55.2% 55.2% 55.2% 55.2% 55.2% 57.1% 58.1% 58.3% 59.3%
# of observations 22,120 22,220 21,018 21,591 21,701 20,591 19,639 19,739 18,639
∆Ii,p is the scaled change in the investment I of competitor i,
IP−IP−1
IP−1
. Competitors are in the same fiscal year and 4-digit industry as restating firms. Restating firms are
excluded from the sample of competitors. Ii,P (Ii,P−1) is the average investment during period P (P − 1). Investment I is capital expenditure (COMPUSTAT #128) plus R&D
expense (COMPUSTAT #46), scaled by prior-year total assets (COMPUSTAT #6). Period P is the three years +1, +2, +3 after the year 0 of the restatement announcement,
while period P − 1 is the three years −1, −2, −3 before year 0. NewsR is restating firms’ abnormal returns at the restatement announcement (CARj,−1,+1,CARj,−5,+5), or the
scaled restatement amount Restatj,t. Corri,j,t−1 is the correlation between competitors’ and restating firms’ raw returns during the fiscal year preceding the fiscal year of the
restatement announcement. MSj,t−1 is the market share of restating firm j in its 4-digit SIC industry, with market shares calculated using sales (COMPUSTAT #12). All variables
are defined in Appendix B. The regressions are estimated from 1997 to 2002 in the pooled cross-section, and use firm and year fixed effects (in F ixedEffects). The t-statistics in
all regressions are based on standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity and are clustered by 4-digit SIC industry (to control for within-industry error correlation). ***
(**) [*] denotes significance at the 1% (5%) [10%] level. “s” (“ns”) stands for significant (non-significant).
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Table 10: Horserace between the various proxies for news in the restatement
∆Ii,p = β1CARi,−5,+5 + β2CARj,−5,+5 + β3Restatj,t + γ1Hazardi,P + γ2∆ExtF ini,p + γ3∆Cashi,p
+γ4∆Qi,p + γ5∆MSi,p + γ6∆Sizei,p + γ7BHi,120 + FixedEffects+ εi,p
Coefficient Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
β1 CARi,−5,+5 0.132** 0.130*** 0.138***
(2.13) (3.11) (3.15)
β2 CARj,−5,+5 0.032*** 0.054*** 0.022**
(3.30) (3.01) (2.31)
β3 Restatj,t 0.022** 0.025* 0.025*
(1.97) (1.77) (1.77)
γ1 Hazardi,P -20.829*** -20.813*** -20.780*** -20.813***
(-19.32) (-19.28) (-19.27) (-19.28)
γ2 ∆ExtF ini,p 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.056***
(9.78) (9.79) (9.66) (9.79)
γ3 ∆Cashi,p 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016***
(9.95) (9.95) (10.07) (9.95)
γ4 ∆Qi,p 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.066***
(14.64) (14.64) (14.57) (14.64)
γ5 ∆MSi,p -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.00
(-0.13) (-0.13) (-0.17) (-0.13)
γ6 ∆Sizei,p -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-0.87) (-0.86) (-0.89) (-0.87)
γ7 BHi,120 -0.007* -0.007* -0.007* -0.007*
(-1.87) (-1.80) (-1.77) (-1.80)
Firm fixed effects s s s s
Year fixed effects s s s s
Adjusted R2 56.4% 56.1% 56.9% 57.2%
# of observations 23,345 23,345 24,455 23,345
∆Ii,p is the scaled change in the investment I of competitor i,
IP−IP−1
IP−1
, during the interval p. Competitors are in the
same fiscal year and 4-digit industry as restating firms. Restating firms are excluded from the sample of competitors.
Ii,P (Ii,P−1) is the average investment during period P (P − 1). Investment I is capital expenditure (COMPUSTAT
#128) plus R&D expense (COMPUSTAT #46), scaled by prior-year total assets (COMPUSTAT #6). Period P
is the three years +1, +2, +3 after the year 0 of the restatement announcement, while period P − 1 is the three
years −1, −2, −3 before year 0. CARi,−5,+5 is competitors’ abnormal returns during the 10 days surrounding the
restatement announcement, CARj,−5,+5 is restating firms’ abnormal returns during the 10 days surrounding the
restatement announcement, and Restatj,t is the scaled restatement amount. All variables are defined in Appendix B.
The regressions are estimated from 1997 to 2002 in the pooled cross-section, and use firm and year fixed effects (in
FixedEffects). The t-statistics in all regressions are based on standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity
and are clustered by 4-digit SIC industry (to control for within-industry error correlation). *** (**) [*] denotes
significance at the 1% (5%) [10%] level. “s” (“ns”) stands for significant (non-significant).
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